By Ted Carter

Introduction
“The railways of the world, which that age built as a monument to posterity, were, not less than the Pyramids of Egypt, the work of labor which was not free to consume in immediate enjoyment the full equivalent of its efforts.” (Keynes, 1919)
Keynes eulogised Victorian capitalism: workers can’t save, only capitalists accumulate therefore inequality is necessary. History delivered its verdict. That same order gave us the Great Depression and financed fascism. It was Soviet workers, not Wall Street’s “saving bees,” who built socialism and smashed Nazism. Keynes wrote an epitaph, not a prophecy.
When the US state responded to the Depression, it wasn’t reform, it was panic. Two billion dollars, a staggering sum in 1930, was injected straight into a dying financial system: a bailout of existing property relations, not a new economy. That new economy was already being built in the USSR. As Soviet central planning proved its industrial superiority, Washington was forced into the unthinkable, turning its bailout machine into an instrument of planning, copying the very system its rulers claimed to oppose.
That machine was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), and it embodies the era’s central contradiction. Surviving the 1933 crash, it became core to the New Deal, pumping over ten billion dollars into private industry to save capitalism from itself. Come the war, it graduated from lender of last resort to command post of wartime production, proof that even a capitalist state will suspend market orthodoxy and socialise risk when its survival is at stake. It built whole industries from nothing.
But having proven planning could outperform market anarchy, the RFC was dismantled by the very capitalists it had rescued, before workers drew the obvious lesson. Its publicly built plants, synthetic rubber, aircraft, aluminium, were sold off to private capital at roughly 70 cents on the dollar (Olson, 2017), handed to the same corporations the Depression had nearly destroyed. The public bore the risk, workers bore the discipline, and finance capital took the postwar spoils. The state saved capitalism only to hand it back to the oligarchs: socialism would have to wait for revolution.
This article analyses the RFC within its context and draws comparison with China’s model of state-directed co-investment. Drawing upon those lessons, this article will present the argument that Australia should build a Sovereign Development Fund, a new institution that keeps permanent public equity in every industry it helps create. The argument for a Sovereign Development fund is essentially a transitional demand, one that subordinates finance to social need, locks capital inside the national borders, and builds the institutional muscle for deeper socialisation. Not the final step to communism, but a necessary one.
The Interwar Counter-Offensive: Finance Capital and the Defence of the Capital Order
The First World War shattered the myth of the “free market.” In every belligerent nation the state assumed direct control over production, distribution and labour. Private capital could not sustain imperialism. The profit motive, left unchecked, produced shortages, profiteering, and chaos. The state, through compulsion, planning, and the suspension of market logic, achieved what capital could not: the total mobilisation of national resources.
This was not socialism. The state remained a capitalist state, and the war was fought to defend the capitalist order. But it looked like socialism. Workers saw the state guarantee food, housing, and employment. They saw the state direct capital and override private property rights. They began to ask: if the state can do this for war, why can’t it do this for peace?
The ruling class understood the danger. The war had awakened the working class to the possibility of a different world. In Russia, workers and peasants had created the first socialist state. In Italy, workers occupied factories and established councils. In Britain, miners, steelworkers, and shipbuilders demanded nationalisation. The response was the reassertion of the capital order – austerity, unemployment, and, in Italy, fascism.
The Capital Order: Economists and the Counter-Offensive
The post-WWI crisis wasn’t only political, it was intellectual. Confronted with working-class militancy on an unprecedented scale, the ruling class didn’t rely on batons and bayonets alone, it mobilised its economists. Clara Mattei’s study of the interwar profession shows austerity was never a technical fix for budgets; it was, and remains, a weapon of class war, engineered to protect capital from workers in revolt (Mattei, 2022). Tracing its origins to interwar Britain and Italy, Mattei shows how the same fear of working-class power produced the same toolkit in both supposedly opposed systems, liberal democracy and fascism alike: central bank “independence” to insulate monetary policy from democratic pressure, the gold standard to discipline wages and public spending and fiscal austerity as, in her words, “a disciplinary device in the engineering of social management to prevent the collapse of capitalism on a global scale” (Mattei, 2022). Britain didn’t need a fascist regime to run this counterinsurgency; Italy did. The logic was identical: tame class conflict, repress wages, foreclose any alternative to capitalism.
This is the context in which the House of Morgan acted. The same Wall Street banks that had bankrolled the Allied war effort now bankrolled the destruction of the Italian working class, not out of ignorance of fascism’s brutality, but because they grasped its usefulness. J.P. Morgan & Co. secured roughly $100 million in loans for Mussolini; in 1925, partner Thomas Lamont met the Duce personally in Rome and Wall Street cheered (Chernow, 1990). The loans propped up the regime and guaranteed that the Italian state would serve capital, not the workers who’d just occupied the factories. Capital, given the choice, will always prefer fascism to workers’ control. Recent history saw this logic repeated, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan’s direct descendant, took $300 billion from the Federal Reserve to absorb Bear Stearns in 2008, the state assuming the risk, the bank assuming the assets, private profit and socialised loss as before (Stiglitz, 2010). A decade after the Morgan-Mussolini loans, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would run this same script through a different mechanism: the state directs capital when crisis threatens the system, then liquidates its own creation the moment the capital order can be safely restored.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation: What It Built
The RFC was created by the Hoover administration in January 1932, during the darkest days of the Great Depression. Its original purpose was to serve as a lender of last resort, providing emergency loans to banks, railroads, and agricultural institutions. Its perceived failure to stem unemployment helped elect Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Under Roosevelt, the RFC was transformed. It disbursed $4 billion to depositors of closed banks and bought stock in financial institutions. It loaned $1 billion to railroads, keeping one-third from bankruptcy. It provided $500 million for unemployment assistance. But its most significant expansion came with the approach of war (Olson, 2017).
In August 1939, the RFC was restructured to lead US production to a war footing. Seven new subsidiaries were established to finance the construction of industrial facilities, manage strategic materials, and develop synthetic rubber, metals, and petroleum reserves.
The scale of wartime production was staggering:
- The Defence Plant Corporation financed or built over 700 plants for ships, planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, magnesium, aluminium, steel, synthetic rubber, and aviation gasoline.
- Synthetic rubber production went from zero to 700,000 tons per year.
- Total RFC borrowing from the Treasury over its lifetime reached $51.3 billion.
The state had done what private capital could not: it had built an industrial base capable of defeating fascism, with the crucial assistance of the Soviet Union, whose socialist industry produced 102,000 tanks and relocated 1,500 factories east of the Urals, and inflicted 80% of German casualties.
The Liquidation: Reasserting the Capital Order
After the war, the RFC’s wartime assets were systematically sold to private capital. The state sold its publicly built assets, including synthetic rubber plants, aircraft factories, and aluminium smelters, to private corporations at approximately 70 cents on the dollar (Berquist, 1945). Major corporations, many of which had been on the brink of collapse during the Depression, acquired these facilities for a fraction of their construction cost.
The RFC was formally terminated in 1957, its remaining functions transferred to other agencies. The lesson of the RFC, that the state could direct capital for collective purpose, was deliberately erased. The capital order was reasserted.
Today, the consequences of that liquidation are visible. The United States, the world’s most powerful military, cannot produce enough 155mm artillery shells to sustain a single proxy war (U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2026). Private contractors, driven by profit, have hollowed out the industrial base. The state, once again, faces the same contradiction it faced in 1940, but this time, it has no RFC.
Australia’s Deindustrialisation: A Class Betrayal
In Australia, the same class logic played out through a different mechanism. The great Australian manufacturers, John Heine & Sons, Charles Ruwolt, and others, were built by private capital, often with government contracts and tariff protection. They employed generations of skilled Australian workers. Heine & Sons designed and built stamping presses, can-making machines, and the iconic Cyclops prams, trikes, and pedal cars. Charles Ruwolt built heavy machinery for mining and defence, designing and manufacturing the Australian 25-pounder used from the 1940s until 1973.
But when the tariff walls came down, Australian wages could not compete with Asia. This was the predictable outcome of capital exercising the same choice the House of Morgan made in 1925: given the option between organised labour and a cheaper, more pliant workforce, capital will always take the latter. China’s export-led industrialisation, which lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, was built on a state-managed ‘low-wage, high-employment’ regime, restrictions on local governments competing to sell concessions to foreign capital (Taegyun Lim, 2021). Western multinationals didn’t design this system, but they piled in eagerly, using the wage differential it created to discipline workers on both ends of the supply chain. This is not old-fashioned colonial plunder; its finance capital doing what it always does, arbitraging labour costs across borders while workers in the Global North and South are both subordinated to the same accumulation drive. And it was never permanent, by 2024, Chinese manufacturing wages had risen to $5-8 per hour, roughly double Vietnam’s and two to three times India’s (Ship4wd Editorial Team, 2026), with production already migrating to cheaper sites still. Capital doesn’t loyally develop a nation; it moves on the moment a cheaper wage bill appears elsewhere. In Australia, the state, leaned on by capital chasing cheaper imports, cut the legs out from under domestic industry, and Labor governments, nominally the party of the worker, presided over the wreckage.
The consequence was predictable. John Heine & Son, unable to compete with imports, was closed by its founder’s great-grandson, who chose to liquidate rather than invest. Vickers Ruwolt, purchased by BHP, was downsized and closed. The nation lost its capacity to make things. The workers, having given decades of skilled labour, were discarded without provision for retraining or redeployment. Capital, driven by quarterly profit cycles, had no interest in training new workers or maintaining strategic industries. It preferred to import cheaper goods or, today, to import skilled workers from the Global South, workers trained at public expense in their home countries, making this a new form of imperialist extraction. The result is the same: a hollowed-out industrial base, a nation dependent on imports, and a working class denied the dignity of productive labour. The state built nothing; private capital destroyed everything with the support of the capitalist state.
The Chinese Model: State-Directed Co-Investment
The People’s Republic of China offers a concrete example of an alternative. China has built the world’s largest economy through a system of state-directed co-investment, in which the state retains ownership stakes, directs investment, and maintains strategic control over the commanding heights of the economy.
How the Chinese model works:
- State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): The state retains majority or significant ownership in strategic industries: energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, and advanced manufacturing.
- Co-Investment: The state partners with private capital (both domestic and foreign) but retains control over strategic decisions.
- Equity Stakes: The state retains permanent equity stakes, sharing in profits and maintaining influence.
- Board Representation: The CPC has seats on the boards of major corporations, with veto power over offshoring, mass layoffs, and foreign acquisitions.
- Capital Controls: The state regulates cross-border capital flows, preventing capital flight and ensuring that domestic savings are invested domestically.
- Strategic Planning: Investment decisions are guided by long-term national plans, not short-term profit.
What this achieves:
- Industrial Capacity: China has built the world’s largest manufacturing base.
- Technological Sovereignty: China has developed advanced industries, semiconductors, electric vehicles, renewable energy, without relying on foreign capital.
- Economic Stability: Capital controls prevent speculative bubbles and capital flight.
- Social Stability: The state’s ownership stakes allow it to protect jobs and communities.
China’s system of state-directed co-investment has produced outcomes that no liberal economy can match technological sovereignty, industrial depth, and the capacity to withstand imperialist pressure. For Australia, the lesson is not to copy China wholesale, but to understand that strategic public ownership is the only defence against the anarchy of the market. Moreover, China’s model is consistent with Lenin’s defence of state capitalism under proletarian control: the commanding heights remain public, the party leads, and the benefits flow to the working class through rising living standards and strategic sovereignty. Whether one calls it “state capitalism” or “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the material results are undeniable.

Collage of the Aswan High Dam (Egypt), Bhilai Steel Plant (India), and the Eisenhüttenstadt high-rise housing project (German Democratic Republic). (Graphic from TriContinental).
A Sovereign Development Fund for Australia: A Transitional Demand
The RFC’s liquidation was not an economic necessity. It was a political choice, a deliberate decision to reassert the capital order and erase the lesson that the state could direct capital for collective purpose. Today, we face the same choice. We can accept the hollowing out of our industrial base, or we can build a new institution that breaks with the capital order.
This is not reformism. It is a transitional demand.
A transitional demand is a proposal that:
- Subordinates capital to social need: Investment decisions are made for the public good, not private profit.
- Builds institutional capacity: Public institutions are created that cannot be easily dismantled.
- Creates a precedent for socialisation: State co-ownership is a step toward full public ownership.
- Traps capital within national borders: Capital controls prevent private capital from fleeing.
- Empowers the working class: Workers gain a stake in the industries that shape their lives.
Australia can build a Sovereign Development Fund that:
- Retains permanent equity stakes in all industries it helps to establish.
- Holds board seats with veto power over offshoring, mass layoffs, and foreign acquisitions.
- Imposes capital controls to prevent capital flight.
- Directs investment toward strategic industries, renewable energy, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and defence production.
- Builds institutional capacity that cannot be easily dismantled by future governments.
How would these demands be realised? The answer lies not in a blueprint, but in a political method: the mass line, a process of developing demands through deep engagement with workers lived experience, testing them in concrete struggles, and refining them through collective practice. The Sovereign Development Fund is not a technocratic proposal; it is a transitional demand that requires a corresponding strategy for building working-class consciousness and organisation. Without this method, the Fund remains a policy imposed from above, precisely the error of bureaucratic reformism. With it, the Fund becomes a demand forged through collective struggle, owned by the workers it is meant to serve.
This is a form of nationalisation with worker representation, not yet full socialisation, but a step toward it. That is precisely what makes it a transitional demand.
Unlike the RFC, which was dismantled once the crisis passed, this Fund would be built with institutional protections—permanent equity, worker representation, and capital controls—that prevent a future government from repeating the liquidation of 1945.
Addressing Objections
Some will object that this is just state capitalism. However, under a workers’ state, or one moving in that direction, that’s no insult at all. Lenin himself defended state capitalism under proletarian control as a necessary stage on the road forward. The question was never the label; it’s who holds the reins of the state and to what end. A Sovereign Development Fund, answerable to the working class through genuine democratic institutions, wouldn’t be a concession to capital, it would be a weapon pointed straight at it.
Others will say we need revolution, not reforms, as though the two-stand opposed. They don’t. Transitional demands aren’t substitutes for revolution; they’re the groundwork that makes it possible. They build institutional capacity, sharpen working-class consciousness, and lay the material base for deeper transformation still to come. The RFC proved the state could plan. A Sovereign Development Fund would prove Australia can plan too, and once that lesson is learned, it cannot be unlearned.
There’ll be those who point to China and cry authoritarianism, as if the point where to import Beijing’s political system wholesale. It isn’t, and China’s polity is not Australia’s. The task is to learn from China’s experience, not copy it, to recognise that state-directed co-investment delivers results no liberal economy can match, while insisting that here, any such model be built under democratic working-class control from the outset.
And when the WTO is invoked as an obstacle, the answer is plain: the WTO is an instrument of capital, its rules built precisely to stop nations protecting their own industry and their own class. Breaking those rules isn’t a problem to be managed, it’s a necessity to be embraced. Capital has never respected national borders when profit was on the line; there is no reason the working class should respect the rules erected to protect it.
Conclusion
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation proved that the state could direct capital for collective purpose. Its liquidation proved that the ruling class would not tolerate that lesson. Clara Mattei’s The Capital Order shows us why: austerity was invented as a counter-offensive to eliminate alternatives to capitalism. The RFC was one such alternative, a brief experiment in state-directed planning that had to be dismantled once the crisis passed. The capital order had to be reasserted.
In Australia today, we face the same contradiction. Our industrial base has been hollowed out, our sovereign capacity degraded, and our working class denied the dignity of productive labour, not by economic necessity, but by political choice, a choice made within the structural constraints of a neoliberal global order that Australia did not create, but that successive governments chose to accommodate rather than resist. China’s state-directed developmental path demonstrates that alternative capitalist trajectories are possible, but they require a degree of state autonomy and strategic control that Australia’s neoliberal settlement has systematically foreclosed.
The Sovereign Development Fund proposed here is a break with that choice, but it will not be granted by a government that serves capital. It can only be won through sustained working-class struggle: union campaigns, parliamentary pressure, and the mass line organising described above. A transitional demand is not a policy to be implemented; it is a program to be fought for. By retaining permanent equity stakes, holding board seats, and imposing capital controls, it would subordinate finance to social need and build institutional capacity that cannot be easily dismantled. It is a transitional demand, not socialism itself, but a step toward it, and one that must be extracted from the state through collective working-class power, not requested as a gift from above.
The alternative is the pattern Mattei describes: the counter-offensive, the reassertion of the capital order, the smothering of workers and the elimination of alternatives. We have seen this before. We know where it leads, to hollowed-out industries, dependent militaries, and a working class robbed of its dignity. The time to break that pattern is now.
Bibliography
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